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Korea’s Participation in Global Value Chains: 
Measures and Implications 
By SUNGHOON CHUNG* 
This paper measures the extent to which South Korea participated in 
global value chains (GVCs) from 1995 through 2011 and scrutinizes 
the consequences of such participation on the Korean economy. To  
this end, the World Input Output Database is utilized to calculate  
GVC income, GVC employment, and value-added exports created by 
Korean and foreign industries. Our findings show that Korea radically 
internationalized its production activities during the sample period, 
widening the gap between gross exports and value-added exports.  
We also document that Korea’s participation in GVCs has changed  
the value-added and employment structures in domestic industries in 
accordance with their comparative advantages while exacerbating  
the degree of wage inequality. 
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GVC Income, GVC Employment,  
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   I. Introduction 
 
he global value chain (hereafter, GVC) refers to the chain-like structure of a 
product’s value-added characteristics across countries resulting from the 
division of the production sequence on a global scale. Although such international 
fragmentation has long been practiced, it has recently drawn significant attention 
from both researchers and policymakers, as technological advancements along with 
ever-lower trade barriers has made it much more active and complex. 
In a seminal paper, Hummels et al. (2001) first developed a measure of imported 
intermediate goods’ share of exports, also known as vertical specialization (VS), 
finding that the VS share of 14 major countries’ exports was approximately 21% in 
1990. They also document that the share increased by almost 30% over the ensuing 
two decades. As a more recent and intuitive example, Linden et al. (2009) dissect
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the iPod, valued at US $300, finding that China, the final iPod exporting country, 
contributes only about $5 to the total value through assembly and inspection steps. 
Meanwhile, Japan earns $27 for each iPod, though not by exporting it directly but 
by providing core parts and components. 
Thus, it is recognized that using gross output or exports may not be appropriate 
to gauge the value of the production activities conducted in each country. Indeed, a 
burgeoning amount of literature introduces alternative measures and analyses based 
on the GVC perspective to better explain what a country does and how much value 
it adds (See Daudin et al. (2011), Johnson and Noguera (2012), Timmer et al. 
(2013, 2014), Koopman et al. (2014), Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez (2015) among 
others). These papers usually apply their measures to cross-country comparison 
analyses, but not to a particular country. 
The main purpose of the present paper is to provide a broad picture of the level 
as well as the change in Korea’s position in this integrated world through GVCs. 
Not only for policy implications, studying the Korean experience is interesting, as 
Korea is representative of small open economies that rely largely on trade. In 
particular, it has been involved in global supply chains since the 1960s as a core 
strategy for its economic growth. Despite this long history, we are deficient in the 
relevant statistics on how much Korea has engaged in the vertical linkages across 
countries and what the consequences of such engagement are. 
Applying the method suggested by Johnson and Noguera (2012) and Timmer  
et al. (2013) and using the World Input Output Database (WIOD), this paper 
specifically calculates three GVC-related measures: value-added exports, GVC 
income and GVC employment. We then use these measures to gauge the degree of 
participation by Korean industries in GVCs during the sample period from 1995 to 
2011. Furthermore, we analyze the compositional changes in value-added aspects 
and employment in the Korean manufacturing industry due to GVC participation. 
Our finding indicates that Korea is one of the most active countries in terms of 
GVC participation among 40 countries. While gross exports had grown, allowing 
Korea to become the seventh largest exporter by 2011, its growth of value-added 
exports, i.e., the domestic value-added created by foreign countries, lagged, 
widening the gap between the two figures. In fact, the ratio of value-added exports 
to gross exports, or the VAX ratio, fell continuously from 75% in 1995 to 59% in 
2011. Moreover, the VAX ratios are the lowest among the top exporting industries, 
such as the petro-chemical, transport equipment, and electronic equipment 
industries. These findings suggest that value-added exports can be an alternative 
measure of the competitiveness of Korean industries in the global market, 
especially when one is more interested in production activities as opposed to 
transacted products. 
We also find that Korea’s active participation in GVCs induced substantial 
changes in its industrial structure in terms of both value-added and employment 
aspects over the sample period. Specifically, 25% of the value added in Korean 
manufactured final goods ultimately went to foreign countries in 1995, but the 
foreign share increased to 38% in 2011. In terms of employment, approximately 
51% of all employees were found to be non-nationals who worked in relation to the 
production of the same Korean manufactured final goods, but this foreign share 
increased further to 60% in 2008. During this period, a critical number of middle- 
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and high-skilled foreign workers were substituted for low- and middle-skilled 
domestic workers, potentially exacerbating wage inequality in Korea. Korean 
manufacturers, as suppliers of intermediate products, also enlarged their role in 
foreign GVCs throughout the same period; the share of manufacturing GDP created 
by participating in foreign GVCs increased from 26% in 1995 to 42% in 2011, and 
the share of employment increased from 26% in 1995 to 37% in 2008. 
This paper contributes to the literature in three ways. First, we provide a useful 
analytical framework with which to measure Korean industries’ global 
competitiveness, overall structure, and its changing patterns in the GVC world. The 
complicated real world is well summarized in our two-country, three-sector 
framework, providing a clear picture and thus informative statistics on the value 
chain structure between domestic and foreign industries.1 
Second, our study complements prior studies of the internationalization of 
production activities using micro-level data by providing aggregate changes and 
related implications. Although micro-based studies have advantages when used to 
identify the causal effect of internationalization on domestic economies, they 
typically lack aggregate consequences. For example, Ahn (2006) and Park (2009) 
estimate the causal, marginal effect of offshoring on domestic employment, but 
these studies are limited in terms of how they identify the numbers of domestic 
workers lost or gained as a result of offshoring.  
Third, by exploiting world input-output tables (WIOTs), our study provides 
useful information that cannot be obtained by analyzing domestic input-output (IO) 
tables. For example, WIOTs allow us to calculate the contribution of each foreign 
country to the total GDP in Korea, whereas domestic IO tables cannot provide such 
information. All analyses of structural changes in Korean industries are only 
possible with WIOTs. 
The remaining sections are organized as follows. Section II provides an 
illustrative example to define the three measures related to GVC and introduces the 
data used in the paper. Section III contrasts statistics based on value-added exports 
and those pertaining to gross exports to measure the degree to which Korea has 
participated in GVCs. It also highlights the recent trend of international 
competitiveness in Korean industries. Section IV narrows our focus to the Korean 
manufacturing industry to show its pattern of structural changes in the composition 
of value-added and employment using GVC income and GVC employment. 
Section V concludes with policy implications.  
 
 
  
 
1In a spirit similar to ours, Kim et al. (2014) and Yoon (2015) measure the competitiveness and value-added 
structure of Korean exports, respectively, using the decomposition method of Wang et al. (2013). Our analyses 
deal with not only exports but also with the production structures of Korean industries. 
INSIDabcdef_:MS_0001MS_0001
IN
SI
D
ab
cd
ef
_:
M
S_
00
01
M
S_
00
01
48 KDI Journal of Economic Policy NOVEMBER 2016 
II. Concepts and Measurement of GVCs 
 
A. An Illustrative Example 
 
In this section, we introduce three measures to evaluate Korea’s participation and 
activity in GVCs: GVC income, GVC employment, and value-added exports. The first 
two measures come from Timmer et al. (2013, 2014), and the last one was originally 
developed by Johnson and Noguera (2012). For formal definitions and detailed 
derivations of each measure, readers can refer to the Appendix or to the original  
papers. Here, we start with a simple example to illustrate the concepts intuitively.  
Suppose there is a firm that produces diamond rings in country B (country B 
refers to the home country). This firm does not mine rough diamonds (intermediate 
good 1) itself but it imports them from country A for $10 per unit. In addition, 
shanks (the band part of a ring) (intermediate good 2) are procured from a domestic 
shank-producing firm at $3 per unit. The firm producing diamond rings in country 
B processes the imported rough diamonds and combines them with the shanks to 
sell in the global market. Figure 1 illustrates this diamond ring GVC structure. 
The processing of rough diamonds and the assembly of ring parts require labor 
and capital inputs, and their value added in unit terms is $4 and $2, respectively. 
Finally, the diamond ring production firm pays $1 for insurance (intermediate good 
3) provided by an insurance company in country C in order to provide buyers with 
a one-year warranty service for any defective or damaged products. Therefore, the 
final price of one diamond ring (final good) is $20, i.e., the sum of the prices of the 
intermediate goods ($10+$3+$1) and the value-added of labor and capital inputs 
($4+$2).2  
 
 
FIGURE 1. GVC OF DIAMOND RINGS 
 
2We assume an absence of a retail margin and transport expenses in this example. In reality, these factors are 
included in the value-added of the final producers (the diamond-ring-producing firm in country B in this example). 
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TABLE 1—ALLOCATION OF INCOME, EMPLOYMENT IN THE DIAMOND RING GVC 
Cnty Industry (Product) 
GVC 
Income 
GVC 
Employment 
GVC 
Capital 
Labor 
Income 
Capital 
Income 
Value-added 
Export 
Gross  
Export 
A Diamond 100 3 2 3×1×10=30 2×3.5×10=70 B:10×2=20 
C:10×8=80 
B:10×10=100 
C: 0 
B Ring 30 2 1 2×0.5×10=10 1×2×10=20 C:3×8=24 C: 0 
Diamond 
Ring 
60 2 1 2×2×10=40 1×2×10=20 C:6×8=48 C:20×8=160 
C Insurance 10 1 0 1×1×10=10 0 B:1×2=2 B:1×10=10 
Total 200 8 4 90 110 174 270 
 
If two diamond rings are bought in country B (domestic market) and eight 
diamond rings are purchased in country C, the final demand for the diamond rings 
is 10. Thus, the total output must be $20×10=$200. The realized value-added of 
each industry in each country is shown in Table 1. As a result of this production 
sequence organized by the diamond ring firm of country B, country A gains $100 
of added value by mining rough diamonds, and by producing shanks and 
manufacturing diamond rings, country B gains added value of $30 and $60, 
respectively. Country C gains $10 of added value by providing the insurance 
service.  
As shown in the example of the production of diamond rings, we define global 
value chains as a fragmented sequence of production along with its corresponding 
value-added structure across countries and industries. The created value-added 
component in each industry of each country is termed the global value chain 
income (GVC income). The sum of GVC income is, hence, equal to the total output 
(=total expenditure).  
Among the participants in this GVC, the diamond-ring-producing firm of 
country B, or the final producer, makes decisions about whether to produce or 
outsource the intermediate goods and from where to outsource once decided. Thus, 
it serves as an organizer of the GVC.3 All other firms participate in the GVC as 
intermediate goods suppliers. 
Meanwhile, the gross domestic products (GDPs) of countries A, B, and C are 
$100, $90, and $10, respectively, as they are expressed as the sum of GVC income 
within each country. Note that the GVC income of country B (=GDP of country B) 
accounts only for 45 percent of the total output, while the GDP of country A 
accounts for 50 percent of the total output. In other words, despite the fact that 
country B is the final producer and exporter of diamond rings, country A receives 
the most income from the diamond ring GVC structure. 
If we know the types and amounts of input used in the production process for 
each country and industry participating in the GVC along with the created value-
added component, we can also calculate how much each factor of production 
indeed creates with regard to added value. As shown in Figure 1, the final producer 
in country B generates $4 and $2 of added value from two units of labor and one 
unit of capital, respectively, for each diamond ring. It is also possible to determine 
the amounts of labor and capital which are injected to produce each of the 
 
3Final producer is not necessarily an organizer in all GVCs. 
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intermediate goods in the production of a diamond ring (the final good), as shown 
in columns (4) and (5) in Table 1. In particular, each country and industry-specific 
labor input required for the production of the final good is defined as the global 
value chain employment (GVC employment). The total final demand of ten 
diamond rings creates GVC employment of 30 units in country A, 40 units in 
country B, and 10 units in country C. 
Summarizing the illustration thus far, the formation of a GVC means the 
participation of various industries (or firms) of different countries in the intricate 
and segmented stages of production, and the generated value-added and labor input 
within such a network are defined as GVC income and GVC employment, 
respectively. GVC income and GVC employment are not directly observed in 
unprocessed data. Instead, it is possible to calculate these factors with certain 
assumptions as to the appropriate data. The calculation method is introduced in the 
next section. Through the GVC analysis, we obtain a clear sense of how the total 
output of $200 is allocated across countries and industries. 
Meanwhile, value-added exports shown in column (6) refer to the amount of 
added value demanded by the foreign final consumers. According to Figure 1, the 
final consumers of the ten diamond rings are country B (two rings) and country C 
(eight rings). Thus, out of the total value-added exports of $100 by country A, $20 
goes to country B and $80 to country C. Country B, by producing shanks and 
manufacturing diamond rings, exports value-added of $24 and $48, respectively, to 
country C. Likewise, country C exports a value-added of $2 to country B, which 
demands two rings. The total value-added exports of $174 and the sales in the 
domestic markets of country B (=$18) and country C (=$8) add up to $200, which 
is the total GVC income (=total output). 
It is important to note the difference between value-added exports and 
conventional gross exports tallied for each country, even with identical 
transactions. The gross exports of country B to country C is $160, which is the 
price of eight diamond rings. However, the value-added exports in country B is 
only $72. The remaining $88 is the sum of the intermediate goods prices imported 
by countries A and C, and it is already accounted for in their exports to country B. 
Moreover, $8 of insurance exported from country C is then re-imported and 
domestically consumed, causing a double-counting problem. In other words, 
88+8=$96 has also been recorded to make the world’s gross exports $270. Due to 
this double-counting problem, country B’s gross export level leaves room for 
overestimating the income of country B. 
Another noticeable difference between value-added exports and gross exports is 
shown in the case of country A. Although country A transacts only with country B, 
80 percent of the created value-added by the mining of rough diamonds is 
ultimately consumed in country C, causing a large discrepancy between the two 
export measures for country A. At first glance, country A’s major trade partner 
appears to be country B, but its trade performance is actually more affected by the 
economic situation of country C, where the majority of diamond ring buyers are 
located. The key aspect of value-added exports is that it splits each country’s gross 
output according to the destination in which it is ultimately absorbed in the form of 
final demand. 
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B. World Input-Output Table 
 
In order to calculate GVC income, GVC employment, and value-added exports 
for the actual economy, we use world input-output tables (WIOTs). The World 
Input Output Database (WIOD) project has developed WIOTs for forty-one 
countries, including 27 EU members and what is referred to as the rest-of-the-
world (ROW), covering the period from 1995 to 2011. The tables connect the trade 
flows of intermediate and final goods across countries and industries. NACE Rev. 1 
provided by the EU is used to classify 35 industries, among which 14 belong in the 
manufacturing sector.4 A thorough description of the methods and original sources 
of information used for the construction of the WIOTs is available in Timmer 
(2012). 
In fact, several leading international organizations and research institutes also 
provide data similar to WIOT, each of them having its own advantages and 
disadvantages. The reasons for using the data constructed by WIOD are as follows: 
(i) WIOT provides more industries and countries relative to other published data 
sources, and (ii) WIOTs are available for every year from 1995 to 2011, while other 
institutions provide tables for only a few years (e.g., every five years). Of course, a 
national input-output table is required every year in order to develop WIOT on a 
yearly basis. If this is not available, additional assumptions such as an invariable 
input-output structure are needed to create it. 
One fact that should be mentioned at this point is that there always exists 
statistical discrepancies in IO tables, and there is no means by which clearly to 
identify the more accurate instances among them. This also applies to the WIOT 
used in this study. Therefore, rather than having absolute confidence in the 
statistical figures calculated from the WIOTs, we place more emphasis on 
understanding trends and relative statuses by means of time series analyses and 
cross-section comparisons. 
The WIOD also provides information such as national input-output tables 
(NIOTs) and what are termed socio-economic accounts (SEAs) at the industry 
level. In particular, SEAs contain data on output, value-added, capital stock, and 
employment factors according to three skill type (i.e., the low, middle, high skill 
types) that are needed to measure the contribution of each production factor to 
economic growth, also known as growth accounting, for the 40 sample countries.5 
We use this data in section 4 to determine whether GVC participation leads to 
changes in the input structure of production factors. 
 
  
 
4The term NACE is derived from the French Nomenclature statistique des Activités économiques dans la 
Communauté Européenne. See also Table A1 and Table A2 in the Appendix for industry classification and sample 
countries in the WIOT, respectively.  
5The data here are constructed in the same manner used by the EU KLEMS database, a database frequently 
used in growth accounting exercises. 
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III. Value-Added Exports in Korea 
 
A. Indicator of Korea’s participation in GVCs 
 
In this section, we present evidence of how active Korea’s GVC participation was 
from 1995 to 2011 by comparing value-added exports and gross exports. This  
analysis calls for a reevaluation of the international competitiveness of Korean 
industries based on value-added exports, which we undertake at the end of the section. 
As the first comparison, Figure 2 shows the time trends of Korea’s export share 
of the world’s exports based on gross exports and value-added exports. For gross 
exports, the share starts at 2.7% in 1995 and increases to 3.3% in 2011, when 
Korea became the seventh largest exporting country in the world. However, the 
value-added export share more or less stagnated over the sample period, widening 
the gap between the two trends. 
Table 2 presents the VAX ratio across the major countries defined in the previous 
section. When gross exports are assumed to be $100, the VAX ratio of Korea is $75 
(3/4) for 1995 but then drops to $59 in 2011. The downward trend in the VAX ratio 
(by 21.7%) is much greater than that of other major countries, including 
manufacturing-based economies such as Germany and Japan. The sharp and 
sudden drop in the VAX ratio indicates that Korea was incorporated into the GVC 
more rapidly compared to other countries.6 
Meanwhile, because value-added content of exports (VAX) is the GDP created  
 
 
FIGURE 2. RATIO OF KOREA’S EXPORTS TO WORLD EXPORTS 
 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations.   
 
6We discuss the implications of the rapid GVC participation of Korean industries in Section 4A. 
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TABLE 2—TIME TRENDS OF THE VAX RATIO BY COUNTRY 
Year 1995 2000 2005 2011 Growth Rate (%) 
Korea 0.75 0.70 0.67 0.59 -21.7 
Japan 0.92 0.9 0.86 0.81 -11.3 
China 0.84 0.82 0.72 0.75 -9.7 
Taiwan 0.67 0.63 0.56 0.52 -21.6 
Germany 0.79 0.74 0.72 0.69 -12.6 
USA 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.79 -4.3 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
 
FIGURE 3. RATIO OF VALUE-ADDED EXPORT TO THE COUNTRY’S GDP 
 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
by foreign demand for the domestically produced goods and services, the rising 
level of VAX within a country can be interpreted as its GDP having a growing 
dependence on foreign markets. When value-added exports are calculated at the 
country level, the contribution of each foreign country to Korea’s GDP becomes 
known. This could not be estimated prior to the creation of WIOTs. 
In that sense, Figure 3 shows the share of value-added exports to the country’s 
GDP. The Korean share of 33.4% in 2011 indicates that approximately one-third of 
Korea’s GDP is generated by the final demand from other countries. When 
considering the world average of 19.2%, Korea’s reliance on overseas markets is 
quite high, and its growth rate from 1995 (53.6%) is also among the highest 
compared to those of other countries in the WIOD data. Of course, this is another 
indication of Korea’s rapid involvement in the global market. 
It can be meaningful to identify the largest foreign consumer of Korean value-added 
goods, and this is what Table 3 shows. Specifically, Table 3 compares value-added 
exports with gross exports in 1995 and 2011 for four major partner countries.    
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TABLE 3—EXPORTS TO MAJOR CONSUMERS OF KOREAN PRODUCTS 
 1995  
 
2011 
 Value-added export 
Gross  
Export 
Difference 
( %p)  
Value-added  
export 
Gross  
Export 
Difference 
( %p) 
Subtotal 62.9 60.5 2.4 58.6 59.4 -0.9 
China  7.2  9.3 -2.1 20.4 25.7 -5.3 
EU 17.7 14.9 2.8 17.2 14.7 2.5 
USA 22.1 20.1 2.1 13.4  9.5 3.8 
Japan 15.9 16.3 -0.4  7.6  9.4 -1.8 
Other 37.1 39.5 -2.3 41.4 40.6 0.8 
Total 100 100  100 100  
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
When examining total exports to these four countries, the value-added exports and 
gross exports both decreased by about 4% (62.9%→58.6%) and 1% (60.5% 
→59.4%), respectively, showing no significant difference between the two years. 
However, we observe a large change between 1995 and 2011 when investigating 
the composition for each country/region; the largest export markets in order were 
the US, the EU, Japan and China in 1995, but the ranking changed to China, the 
EU, the US, and Japan by 2011. China’s position on the list is particularly notable 
as its share of Korea’s value-added exports surged from 7.2% in 1995 to 20.4% in 
2011. Korea’s dependence on the Chinese market can be accurately calculated by 
multiplying the dependence rate by the value-added export ratio, which was found 
to be 0.334×0.204×100 = 6.8%. In other words, nearly 7% of Korea’s GDP is 
generated by China’s final demand. Unlike China, the ratios were reduced in Japan 
and the US such that the sum of the two countries’ ratios became similar to that of 
China alone. The dependence rates for the EU, US and Japan are 5.7%, 4.5% and 
2.5%, respectively, and together with China, they amount to 20%, meaning that 
one-fifth of Korean GDP is generated by these three major trade partners. 
Finally, we observe that in both 1995 and 2011, the gross export ratio is larger 
than the value-added export ratio in China and Japan. This may leave room for 
overstating China and Japan as consumers of domestic goods and services. The 
situation is reversed in the cases of US and EU, which both play a more significant 
role as consumers than would be expected in the gross export figures, as the gross 
export ratio is smaller than the value-added export ratio. 
The dependence of domestic value-added on foreign demand may differ by 
industry. To check whether this is the case, Figure 4 shows the industry-specific 
shares of gross exports and value-added exports in the GDP for 2011. Indeed, the 
dependence on foreign markets differs significantly between the manufacturing and 
non-manufacturing industries. In particular, approximately two-thirds of the 
manufacturing value-added figure is attributed to foreign demand. Within the 
manufacturing industry, light industries such as food-processing, textiles and wood 
and paper show a relatively low dependence rate of around 30%, while electronics 
(78.3%) and transport equipment (76.6%) generate more than three-fourths of the 
total value-added figure from foreign demand. Hence, Korea’s manufacturing 
industries, especially those on a large scale, can be significantly affected by 
worldwide business cycles due to their high dependence on foreign markets. 
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FIGURE 4. EXPORT SHARE IN GDP BY INDUSTRY 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
The ratio of gross exports to GDP for the entire manufacturing industry is 
146.5%, and the ratio is highest in the transportation equipment industry given its 
export amount of more than twice the GDP (211.7%). The higher gross exports as 
compared to GDP stems from the fact that gross exports includes the value-added 
figures generated by (i) other domestic industries and by (ii) foreign industries 
within the GVC of transportation equipment. Thus, gross exports cannot tell us 
how much foreign purchases contribute to the industry’s GDP, whereas value-
added exports can serve as a suitable measure for this. 
We can also calculate the industry-level VAX ratios using the information in 
Figure 4. For example, the VAX ratio of the transportation equipment industry is 
76.6/211.7 = 0.36, the lowest among all industries. Although the ratio of gross 
exports to GDP is the largest among all industries, approximately two-thirds of its 
exports can be attributed to other domestic industries and foreign countries, 
reducing its contribution to GDP. For the same reason, we can easily witness a low 
VAX ratio in some of the leading export industries, such as the petro-chemistry, 
machinery, and electrical and electronic products industries. The VAX ratio for the 
entire manufacturing sector is 0.44. In the agriculture and service industries, the 
VAX ratios were found to be 8.06 and 1.47, respectively, meaning that value-added 
exports in those industries are greater than gross exports. The high VAX ratio in 
non-manufacturing sectors is easily understood because primary products and 
services are often inherent in exported manufacturing goods as intermediate inputs. 
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B. International Competitiveness of Korean Industries 
 
Finally, we assess the international competitiveness of Korean industries based 
on their value-added exports. Thus far, gross exports have been widely used as a 
measure of international competitiveness. For example, the revealed comparative 
advantage (RCA) index suggested by Balassa (1965) is popularly used. The RCA is 
calculated as follows: 
 
(1)                 /
/
ici ci
ci
c c ici ci
GX GXRCA
GX GX

    
 
The RCA index for industry i in country c is equal to the proportion of the gross 
exports of industry i in country c (ܩܺ௖௜ ) within the country’s gross exports 
(numerator) divided by the proportion of the world gross exports of industry i in 
the world’s gross exports (denominator). If the numerator is larger than the 
denominator, country c can be said to have a comparative advantage in sector i. 
However, because the figure for gross exports includes value-added factors 
generated by industries and countries other than industry i and country c, the RCA 
can misrepresent the true competitiveness of an industry. To give an example, many 
electronic products, such as the iPhone, are assembled and exported from China to 
countries all over the world. Though China is involved in a low value-added 
activity (assembly in this example), the amount of gross exports is high due to the 
high price of the iPhone, and so is the RCA index. Therefore, the RCA index 
measured in terms of gross exports is likely to overestimate the true 
competitiveness of the Chinese electrical and electronic products industry. Another 
important problem when using gross exports is that it is impossible to measure 
services that are inherently linked to the exported goods. Therefore, assessing the 
international competitiveness of the service industry using the RCA index is 
inappropriate. 
Using value-added exports in the RCA calculation can circumvent these 
problems. Because only the value of the assembly process is factored into value-
added exports, we can accurately measure the share of China in its export of 
electronic products. Moreover, because the exact value of the service provision is 
applied to the RCA calculation, it is possible to make a meaningful comparison of 
the service competitiveness between countries. This new equation for value-added 
RCA (VRCA) can be generated simply by replacing gross exports with value-
added exports. 
 
(2)               /
/
ici ci
ci
c c ici ci
VAX VAXVRCA
VAX VAX

    
 
The VRCA index for each domestic industry is compared with the standard RCA 
index for the same industries in Figure 5. As presented in the figure, a considerable 
gap between VRCA and RCA is found in many industries, presenting different 
implications with regard to international competitiveness. For example, the metal 
and non-metal industry has been at a comparative disadvantage until recently  
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FIGURE 5. REVEALED COMPARATIVE ADVANTAGE BY INDUSTRY 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
according to the RCA index (RCA<1). However, the VRCA index shows that the 
metal and non-metal industries have a comparative advantage and that the level of 
the advantage has been rising. Korea’s leading manufacturers, represented by 
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electric and electronic products and transportation equipment, have a comparative 
advantage according to both the RCA and VRCA indices, but VRCA is higher and 
increasing, thus diverging from RCA. The competitiveness of the two industries in 
generating added value in the foreign market (VRCA) can be said to be higher than 
what was implied by the standard index (RCA). 
The overall change in the international competitiveness of the Korean 
manufacturing sector during the past 20 years can be observed in the first seven 
graphs in Figure 5. The competitiveness of the food-processing and textile 
industries has been dropping, while the competiveness of the wood and paper and 
the petro-chemistry industries was stagnant from 1995 to 2011. On the other hand, 
durable goods such as metals and non-metals, machinery, electrical and electronics 
goods, and transportation equipment have showed constantly enhanced 
competitiveness. What about the service industry? All of the service industries 
presented in the last five graphs in Figure 5 are found to have a comparative 
disadvantage or show weakening international competitiveness. Because the 
standard RCA indices for services may not correctly reflect the competitiveness of 
Korean services, we do not try to interpret them. 
In sum, value-added exports provide useful information that gross exports 
cannot provide, as value-added exports focus on production activity rather than on 
products per se. Consequently, statistical indicators based on value-added exports 
can be used as alternative measures for evaluating the competitiveness of domestic 
activities in the international market. 
  
IV. Structural Changes in  
the Korean Manufacturing Industry through  
its Participation in GVCs 
 
As shown in the previous section, Korea’s active participation in GVCs allows 
us to predict many changes in its compositional structure of industry-specific 
income and labor input. In this sense, this section analyzes the structural changes of 
GVC income and employment in the Korean manufacturing industry over the 
sample period. The reasons for focusing on the manufacturing industry are as 
follows: (1) GVC participation is the most vigorous in the manufacturing industry. 
(2) The flow of intermediate goods from the manufacturing to the non-
manufacturing sector is much more frequent and intensive than the other way 
around. 
We start by introducing the framework used for our analyses. Based on the 
mathematical exposition in Timmer et al. (2013) for calculating GVC income, we 
originally arrive at a 1435×1435 square matrix (41 countries multiplied by 35 
industries).7 Dealing with such a large matrix not only complicates the analysis but 
also makes it difficult to obtain the desired information. We thus aggregate 
countries into Korea (KOR) and the rest of the world (ROW) and industries into 
agriculture (AGR), manufacturing (MFC), and service (SVC) to formulate a two- 
 
7See also Timmer et al. (2014) pp. 102~103 for an explanation of the GVC income matrix. 
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TABLE 4—TWO-COUNTRY, THREE-SECTOR GVC STRUCTURE 
 
The Final Producer (or product) of GVC GDP/Emp. 
by industry KOR ROW AGR MFG SVC AGR MFG SVC 
GVC 
Income 
/ 
GVC 
Emp. 
KOR 
AGR        
MFG        
SVC        
ROW 
AGR        
MFG        
SVC        
Total Output  
/ Total Emp.       
World 
GDP/Emp. 
 
country, three-sector matrix for GVC income.8 The same matrix is also used for 
GVC employment by simply replacing the numbers in each cell. 
The simplified GVC income structure is shown in Table 4. Recall the breakdown 
into an organizer and suppliers in a GVC based on their roles. Column titles in 
Table 4 indicate the organizers of GVCs, and row titles refer to the suppliers; there 
are six organizers and six suppliers in this two-country, three-sector world. We first 
examine the second column (6×1 cells), referring to GVC income (and GVC 
employment) created by the six suppliers participating in the domestic (i.e., 
Korean) manufacturing GVC. We then move to the second row (1×6 cells), 
referring to the GVC incomes of domestic manufacturers through participation in 
six GVCs.  
 
A. Structural Changes in the Domestic Manufacturing GVC 
 
We now investigate GVC income created each year by industries that participate 
in the GVC organized by the Korean manufacturing sector. Figure 6 presents the 
proportion of each industry’s value-added (i.e., GVC income) in Korea’s total 
manufacturing output. Along with the VAX ratio in section 3, the GVC income 
ratio within the domestic manufacturing GVC can be used to measure the extent to 
which the domestic manufacturing sector has been internationalized over the 
sample period. 
Specifically, the proportions of GVC income generated by foreign industries in 
the GVC gradually increased from 24.5% in 1995 to 37.5% in 2011. Among the 
three foreign industries, the share for the agricultural sector increases the most, 
from 5% to 12.7%, followed by the service sector (8.6%→12.1%) and the 
manufacturing sector (11%→12.7%) in that order. In contrast, the shares of GVC 
income created by the domestic industries have all been reduced; the proportion 
fell the most in the agricultural sector (8.7% → 3.2%) and then service 
(17.3%→14%) and manufacturing sectors (49.6%→45.3%) in that order. 
 
 
8The GVC income matrix is calculated first and is then aggregated to make the two-country, three-sector 
matrix. Utilities and construction are included in the service industry category. 
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FIGURE 6. SECTORAL INCOME SHARES WITHIN THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING GVC 
Note: Utilities and construction are included in the service industry category. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
The trend shown in Figure 6 implies that the Korean manufacturing sector has 
replaced the domestic contents with foreign contents and that this is particularly 
true for raw materials and services. In other words, the domestic manufacturing 
sector has steadily intensified the internationalization of production activities by 
increasing raw materials and services offshoring. This rapid internationalization 
has indeed raised concerns regarding the hollowing out of the domestic 
manufacturing sector. 
However, such concerns may be trivial when we take into account the total 
output of domestic manufacturing goods; if the total output in the manufacturing 
industry itself increases enough, GDP can still increase even when a significant 
portion is transmitted abroad through offshoring. Putting this differently, the effects 
that cause changes in GVC income can be divided into two parts. One is the 
substitution effect which arises when the domestic value-added is transmitted 
abroad and reduce the GDP of home country. The other is the output effect, where 
the variation in total output affects the level of GVC income created by the home 
country. If the output effect, caused by an increase in total output, is greater than 
the substitution effect, the GDP can still increase in the domestic manufacturing 
GVC.9 
 
 
 
9For the same reason, the declining trend in the VAX ratio of Korea itself should not be a concern as long as 
the total export values compensate sufficiently for the decrease in the domestic value-added per unit of export 
value. 
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TABLE 5—GVC INCOME IN 1995 AND 2011 
(A) 1995 ($ HUNDRED-MILLIONS, 1995 PRICE) (B) 2011 ($ HUNDRED-MILLIONS, 1995 PRICE) 
 
KOR  ROW GDP 
  
KOR  ROW GDP AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC 
K 
O 
R 
AGR 139  138  31.1 0.7 10.6 9.1 329 K 
O 
R 
AGR 74.0  70.5 50.5  0.4 7.0 7.5 210 
MFC 11.4  793  310 9.6 217 160 1501 MFC 10.7 1010  384 20.6 504 507 2436 
SVC 13.5  276 2726 9.6 130 161 3316 SVC 14.1  312 3770 13.5 243 350 4703 
R 
O 
W 
AGR  5.5   79   70 R 
O 
W 
AGR 10.4  284  308 
MFC  5.6  175  139 MFC  6.5  282  242 
SVC  6.1  138  151 SVC  8.3  270  361 
Total 181 1600 3426 Total 124 2228 5115 
 
(C) DIFFERENCE BETWEEN 2011 AND 1995 (D) % CHANGE 
 
KOR  ROW GDP   
KOR  ROW GDP AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC 
K 
O 
R 
AGR -65 -68 19.4 -0.3 -3.6 -1.6 -119 K 
O 
R 
AGR -47 -49  62 -38 -34 -18 -36 
MFC -0.7 217 74 11 287 347 935 MFC  -6  27  24 114 132 217 62 
SVC 0.7 35 1044 3.9 113 190 1387 SVC  5  13  38  40  87 118 42 
R 
O 
W 
AGR 4.9 205 238 R 
O 
W 
AGR 89 260 342 
MFC 0.9 107 103 MFC 16  61  74 
SVC 2.2 132 210 SVC 36  96 139 
Total -57 628 1689 Total -32  39  49 
Note: Data on ROW is omitted in order to concentrate on Korean industry. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
Analyzing the changes in GVC income by isolating one effect from the other 
requires a more sophisticated model along with more specific data. Given the 
delicacy and availability of our model and data, we can at least identify which of 
the two effects is greater within the given period of time. Tables (a) and (b) in Table 
5 display GVC income by industry for the years 1995 and 2011, and tables (c) and 
(d) show the difference and the growth rate in GVC income between the two years, 
respectively. 
All participating industries in the Korean manufacturing GVC create added 
value of $160 billion in 1995, which increases by $62.8 billion (39%) to $222.8 
billion in 2011. Among the $62.8 billion, $18.4 billion was created by the domestic 
industries, while the remaining $44.4 billion was generated by foreign industries. 
When calculated in terms of the growth rate, the real GVC income increases by 
15% in domestic industries and 113% in foreign industries. This implies that the 
substitution effect increases from 1995 to 2011, but the output effect is even 
greater, making the net effect increase the real domestic GDP by 15%.10 This result 
is consistent with recent studies that find a positive effect of foreign investment on 
domestic activities (e.g., Desai et al. 2009, Jang and Hyun 2012).  
 
 
10Offshoring affects both the substitution and output effect directly, but the output effect cannot be fully 
explained by offshoring alone, as it is also caused by productivity growth through technical progress. 
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FIGURE 7. GROSS OUTPUT DIFFERENCES OF DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING COMPARED TO 1995 
Note: GVC income adjusted to 1995 constant hundred-million US$. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
However, in the domestic agricultural sector, GVC income decreases regardless 
of the increase in total output because the substitution effect is greater than the 
output effect. The GVC income of the domestic service sector does not increase as 
much. These phenomena imply that the size of the output effect may not always 
outweigh the substitution effect, as the substitution effect gradually intensifies 
through offshoring, while the output effect is easily influenced by aggregate 
shocks, such as recessions or financial crises, leading to a significant drop in GVC 
income. Thus, it is necessary to observe the change in GVC income by separating 
the two effects for all years in comparison with the base year of 1995. 
Figure 7 plots the trend in the differences in the GVC income levels for each 
year from the level in 1995. The total output differences for each year are then 
divided into those of the domestic and foreign value-added. The GVC income of 
foreign industries rises gradually with small dips and marks steadily above the 
level for 1995, except for the period of the financial crisis in the 1990s. On the 
other hand, the GVC income of domestic industries is rather turbulent with 
significant drops in response to the sharp economic shocks in the late 1990s and 
late 2000s. The output effect over the course of the year is not large enough to 
offset the substitution effect, and Korea’s real GDP by participating in the domestic 
manufacturing GVC remained lower than that of 1995 until recently. 
As the location of production activities has shifted from Korea to foreign 
countries, the employment structure is expected to exhibit a pattern identical to that 
of the income structure. To confirm the validity of this statement, we put GVC  
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FIGURE 8. SECTORAL EMPLOYMENT SHARES IN THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING GVC 
Note: Utilities and construction are included in the service industry category. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations 
 
employment in place of GVC income in Table 4. Subsequently, Figure 8 shows the 
GVC employment shares in the Korean manufacturing GVC. WIOD’s SEAs 
provides data on national and industrial characteristics during the period from 1995 
to 2009. 
In Figure 8, we find the increase in the proportion of foreign GVC employment, 
just as in the case of GVC income. Specifically, in 1995 domestic and foreign 
workers numbered 4.7 million and 4.9 million, respectively, corresponding to 49% 
and 51% of the total working population in the domestic manufacturing GVC. 
However, 3.6 million domestic workers and 5.5 million foreign workers account 
for 40% and 60%, respectively, of the total labor force in 2008.11 The substitution 
effect from the domestic to foreign industries occurs in GVC employment as well. 
The structure of GVC income and employment are not identical in all respects 
however. One difference that stands out is that the proportion of foreign labor input 
is generally higher than that of foreign income. Foreign workers participating in the 
domestic manufacturing GVC already accounted more than 50% of the total labor 
force in 1995. The employment share in the foreign agricultural sector is especially 
high, presenting a stark contrast to the share in income in the agricultural sector. 
This suggests that the difference in the labor wage between the domestic and 
foreign industries is one of the main reasons for offshoring. 
Dividing GVC income by GVC employment in each cell gives the labor  
 
11We excluded 2009 data because in 2009, production and employment plummeted as the global financial 
crisis hit the world economy. Although 2008 was also affected by the exchange rate shock during the initial phase 
of the crisis, we still use 2008 data, as the GVC income shares for that year appear to be closest to those of 2011 
and because its GVC employment shows a pattern similar to that for 2007. 
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TABLE 6—GVC EMPLOYMENT AND REAL LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN 1995 AND 2008 
(A) 1995 GVC EMPLOYMENT  
(TEN-THOUSANDS) 
(B) 2008 GVC EMPLOYMENT  
(TEN-THOUSANDS) 
 
KOR  ROW TOT EMP  
KOR  ROW TOT EMP AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC 
K 
O 
R 
AGR 110 106   14 0.5 7.1 5.7  243 K 
O 
R 
AGR 62  61   43 0.3 4.6 4.7  175 
MFC 3.2 263   90 2.7 75 48  482 MFC 1.9 184   73 2.8 80 72  414 
SVC 4.6 103 1089 4.1 51 63 1315 SVC 4.7 116 1412 6.8 91 135 1766 
R 
O 
W 
AGR  34 298  150 R 
O 
W 
AGR 18 258  260 
MFC 3.2 105   76 MFC 3.4 155  146 
SVC 4.1  89  162 SVC 4.0 139  193 
Total 160 965 1580 Total 93 913 2127 
 
 (C) 1995 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY  
($ THOUSANDS, 1995 PRICE) 
(D) 2008 LABOR PRODUCTIVITY  
($ THOUSANDS, 1995 PRICE) 
 
KOR  ROW AVG  
KOR  ROW AVG AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC AGR MFC SVC 
K 
O 
R 
AGR 12.6 13.1 22.8 14.5 14.9 16.0 13.6 K 
O 
R 
AGR 10.1 10.2 11.4 12.8 13.2 14.1 10.7 
MFC 35.8 30.1 34.6 36.1 29.1 33.1 31.2 MFC 46.2 44.7 47.5 58.7 50.3 53.5 47.9 
SVC 29.3 26.7 25.0 23.7 25.4 25.4 25.2 SVC 24.1 22.7 25.0 21.7 22.5 22.9 24.6 
R 
O 
W 
AGR  1.6  2.6  4.6 R 
O 
W 
AGR  4.7  8.4 10.8 
MFC 17.4 16.7 18.2 MFC 14.5 16.3 16.1 
SVC 15.1 15.5  9.3 SVC 17.6 17.7 18.8 
Average 11.4 16.6 21.7 Average 11.0 20.4 22.6 
Note: Data on ROW is omitted in order to concentrate on Korean industries. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations  
 
productivity (i.e., value-added per worker) and its trends. (a) and (b) in Table 6 
show GVC employment in 1995 and 2008, respectively, and (c) and (d) in the table 
calculate the real labor productivity for those years. Both the share and absolute 
level of labor input decrease in the domestic agricultural and manufacturing sector 
but increase in the domestic service sector. Accordingly, the service sector labor 
productivity within the domestic manufacturing GVC is decreased from $26,700 in 
1995 to $22,700 in 2008, showing a reduction of approximately 15%. 
The main reason for the lower productivity of the service sector within the 
domestic manufacturing GVC is that the labor productivity in the business service 
industry, which is the most committed service in terms of value-added, dropped 
significantly from $39,300 in 1995 to $23,100 in 2008.12 In contrast to the decline 
in domestic service productivity, foreign service productivity improved by 14% 
during the same period. 
  
 
12See Table A3 for the service productivities engaged in the Korean manufacturing GVC at a disaggregate 
level. 
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B. Redistribution of Production Factors within  
the Domestic Manufacturing GVC 
 
Given the finding that domestic income and employment in the Korean 
manufacturing GVC were replaced by foreign income and employment, 
respectively, through its active offshoring, we scrutinize in more detail the re-
distribution of the domestic and foreign factors of production within the GVC. 
Production factors that create added value can be divided in various ways 
depending on the classification method, but we classify them into labor and capital 
in this study. Capital is defined in its broadest sense and includes all production 
factors other than labor. On the other hand, labor is further divided into the low-
skilled, middle-skilled and high-skilled types. In accordance with the standard 
classification method provided by the socio-economic accounts of WIOD, lower 
secondary or less, post-secondary to non-tertiary education, and tertiary education 
or above are classified as low-, middle-, and high-skilled workers, respectively. 
In Table 7, the income for each of the production factors in 1995 and 2008 is 
calculated as a share of the total GVC income. The labor and capital income ratios 
in both the domestic and foreign industries add up to 100, as shown in the shaded 
area in the top two panels of the table. The labor income share in each industry is 
then divided into the shares for low-, middle-, and high-skilled labor. When 
examining the difference between the figures for 2008 and 1995, the income shares 
for low- and middle-skilled labor show a noticeable decline, by 9.7%p and 7.6%p 
respectively, whereas the share of high-skilled labor has increased slightly by 
 
TABLE 7—DOMESTIC & FOREIGN SHARES OF FACTOR INCOMES WITHIN  
THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING GVC 
Year 1995 (%) 
Prod. Factor Low-skill Mid-skill High-skill Labor Capital 
Domestic 13.2  26.3  18.5  57.9  17.6  
Foreign  3.8   6.3   3.1  13.2  11.2  
Developed  1.9  5.3  2.7  9.9  6.4 
Developing  1.9 1  0.4  3.3  4.8 
 
Year 2008 (%) 
Prod. Factor Low-skill Mid-skill High-skill Labor Capital 
Domestic 3.5  18.7  19.8  42.0  19.7  
Foreign 4.2   7.8   4.8  16.8  21.5  
Developed 1.3  4.9  3.6  9.8  7.1 
Developing 2.9  2.8  1.3  7.0 14.4 
 
Year 2008 - 1995 (%p) 
Prod. Factor Low-skill Mid-skill High-skill Labor Capital 
Domestic -9.7  -7.6  1.3  -15.9   2.1  
Foreign  0.4   1.5  1.7    3.6  10.2  
Developed -0.6 -0.4 0.9  -0.1  0.7 
Developing  1.0  1.8 0.9   3.7  9.6 
Note: Developed country consists of 20 out of 40 WIOD countries, excluding Korea. They are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United States. The rest of the WIOD countries plus 
ROW are classified as developing countries. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
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1.3%p. Due to the significant drop in the shares of low and middle-skilled income, 
the total labor income share has also been reduced by 15.9%, while the total capital 
income share has increased by 2.1%p. In consequence, the labor share of total 
factor income has decreased by 9%p, from 77% in 1995 to 68% in 2008. 
The 13.8%p reduction in total in the domestic income shares has been replaced 
by increases in all of the foreign factor income shares. Note that, however, the 
increment of each share in the foreign industries is not proportional to that in the 
domestic industries. For example, despite the significant drops in the low- and 
middle-skilled labor income shares of domestic industries, the corresponding 
shares of foreign industries increased only slightly, by 0.4%p and 1.5%p, 
respectively. Meanwhile, it is interesting to note that high-skilled foreign labor 
income has increased even more, by 1.7%p. 
The higher increase in the high-skilled labor income share is most likely due to 
the various destinations for production offshoring. For example, the manufacturers 
of leading-edge products and professional business services are likely to be 
offshored in advanced countries, increasing the high-skilled income share within 
the foreign industry. On the other hand, the low- and middle-skilled income shares 
may increase in developing countries, which are involved in simple assembly 
production processes. 
Therefore, we divide the factor income shares into those of developed and 
developing countries. As expected, low- and middle-skilled income shares 
decreased in developed countries but increased in developing countries. However, 
the corresponding increments are only 1% and 1.8% in developing countries, and 
these levels do not appear to be high enough to compensate for the reduction in the 
domestic income shares. Rather, it is the increment in the capital income share in 
developing countries (9.6%p) that compensates for most of the reduction of the 
domestic income shares. But again, this result is not surprising, as developing 
countries tend to maintain a higher rate of return on their scarce capital, as 
explained in Timmer et al. (2014).  
In the same manner presented in Table 7, we finally show in Table 8 the GVC 
employment shares by skill level between domestic and foreign industries within 
the domestic manufacturing GVC. The shaded areas in the top two panels of the 
table add up to 100, and the foreign employment shares are divided into those of 
developed and developing countries, as was done before. Moreover, we report the 
real average wages for each skill level by dividing labor income by the 
corresponding number of workers employed for a clearer understanding of the 
redistribution of the different types of labor across countries and industries within 
the GVC. 
In the table, we note that the changes in the employment shares present a pattern 
similar to those of income shares. The high-skilled labor share has increased while 
the middle- and low-skilled labor shares have decreased within the domestic 
industries. The patterns of the increased high-skilled labor share and decreased 
low-skilled labor share are also evident in the foreign industries. Moreover, the 
middle- and high-skilled labor shares have increased greatly while the low-skilled 
labor share remained the same in developing countries. 
The phenomenon by which the income and employment shares of middle- and 
high-skilled labor increase more than those of low-skilled labor is consistent with  
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TABLE 8—DOMESTIC & FOREIGN SHARES OF EMPLOYMENT AND 
CORRESPONDING AVERAGE REAL WAGES WITHIN THE DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING GVC 
Year 1995 
Employment (%) Wage ($ thousands) 
Prod. Factor Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Domestic 13.8 23.5 11.6 15.8 18.5 26.4 
Foreign 38.7 10.6  1.8 - - - 
Developed  1.2  2.4  0.8 27.8 36.7 56.9 
Developing 37.5  8.2 1  0.8  2.1  6.1 
 
Year 2008 
Employment (%) Wage ($ thousands) 
Prod. Factor Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Domestic 4.4 19.5 15.8 23.2 27.8 36.1 
Foreign 38.5 17.6  4.2 - - - 
Developed 1  2.8  1.3 38.5 50.2 79.6 
Developing 37.5 14.8  2.9  2.2  5.5 12.4 
 
Year 2008 – 1995 
Employment (%p) Wage ($ thousands) 
Prod. Factor Low Mid High Low Mid High 
Domestic -9.4 -4 4.2  7.4  9.3  9.7 
Foreign -0.2 7 2.4 - - - 
Developed -0.2 0.4 0.5 10.7 13.5 22.7 
Developing 0 6.6 1.9  1.4  3.4  6.3 
Note: Developed country consists of 20 out of 40 WIOD countries, excluding Korea. They are Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Canada, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Finland, France, United Kingdom, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Japan, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Taiwan, and the United States. The rest of the WIOD countries plus 
ROW are classified as developing countries. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
the claim by Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999). These authors argue that the tasks 
that were once done by unskilled labor in advanced countries are now completed 
by middle- or high-skilled workers of developing countries, thus decreasing the 
demand for unskilled labor in developed countries while increasing the demand for 
and income of skilled labor in developing countries. 
Finally, the table indicates an exacerbated degree of wage inequality between 
skilled and unskilled labor in all country groups, which again confirms the claim 
made by Feenstra and Hanson (1997, 1999).13 Compared to foreign countries, 
however, the relative wage gap according to skill level is not that large in Korea. 
Perhaps this can be explained by the fact that the high college enrollment rate has 
increased the share of high-skilled labor in Korea. 
 
 C. Change in the Pattern of  
Domestic Manufacturers’ GVC Participation 
 
We now turn our attention to the trends of GVC incomes domestic 
manufacturers create by participating in GVCs as suppliers. As shown in Table 4,  
 
13Jeon et al. (2013) employ Feenstra and Hansen’s (1997, 1999) empirical strategy to identify the offshoring 
and trade effect on the wage premium in Korean industries. Their result is consistent with ours. 
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FIGURE 9. INCOME SHARES OF DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING BY PARTICIPATING IN SIX GVCS 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations 
 
there are six GVCs joined by domestic manufacturers as suppliers including its 
own. The second row in the table refers to the GVC incomes generated through its 
participation. GVC income in each cell is then depicted in Figure 9 as a percentage 
of the total, which forms the GDP of the domestic manufacturing industry. 
The GVC income share from participating in the three foreign GVCs is 25.7% 
for 1995, and it gradually increases to 42.3% for 2011. Specifically, 42.3% of the 
domestic manufacturing GDP is generated by participating in foreign GVCs. In 
addition, the income generated by participating in foreign GVCs has been greater 
than the income through its own GVC since 2009. Therefore, the production of 
intermediate goods to sell in the global market plays a more significant role for 
domestic manufacturers as compared to the production of final goods. Thus, the 
participation of domestic manufacturers as suppliers in foreign GVCs is as 
conspicuous as the participation as an organizer; the levels have been active in both 
cases. 
We can find how much of the domestic manufacturing GVC income changes in 
each of the six GVCs by looking at the second rows of (a) through (d) in Table 5. 
For example, as shown in (d) in the table, the domestic manufacturing GVC 
incomes change by -6%, 27%, and 24% within domestic GVCs, whereas these 
levels increase by 114%, 132%, and 217% in the foreign GVCs. Therefore, more 
than two-thirds (69%) of the increase in the domestic manufacturing GDP between 
1995 and 2011 can be attributed to the income generated by participating in foreign 
GVCs as suppliers. 
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FIGURE 10. EMPLOYMENT SHARES OF  
DOMESTIC MANUFACTURING BY PARTICIPATING IN SIX GVCS 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
 
Figure 10 provides information about the domestic manufacturing GVC employ-
ment created by both home and foreign GVCs. As in the case of GVC income, the 
GVC employment share within the foreign GVCs increases from 26.1% in 1995 to 
37.4% in 2008. The GVC income and employment shares are similar in 1995 
(26%), but over time we find that the income share surpasses the employment 
share. In other words, the same domestic manufacturers happen to have higher 
productivity when participating in foreign GVCs than in the domestically 
organized GVCs. This is illustrated in the second rows of (c) and (d) in Table 6. 
If the result above is true, it is plausible that the suppliers of intermediate goods 
to export abroad have higher productivity than those that satisfy the domestic 
demand. The reason for the higher productivity cannot be explained directly in this 
study, but related literature gives interesting explanations, such as the tendency of 
highly productive firms to enter export markets (Melitz 2003) and the learning 
effect of exporting firms to become highly productive (De Loecker 2013). 
 
V. Concluding Remarks 
 
Global value chains have been widespread in recent decades due to 
technological developments and greater trade openness across countries. Firms 
now have more options than before regarding how to produce a good; by 
strategically organizing their production sequences on a global scale, they can 
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improve their efficiency and thus the competitiveness of their products.  
How have Korean industries utilized this changing environment and what are the 
consequences? To answer this question, we formally measure the extent to which 
Korea has participated in GVCs over the last two decades and evaluate how this 
level affects the value-added and employment structure in the Korean 
manufacturing industry. It was found here that Korea is one of the countries that 
participated in GVCs most actively between 1995 and 2011, both as the organizer 
of its own GVC and as a supplier of foreign GVCs. As a result, the final products 
of the Korean manufacturing industry contain a greater value-added from foreign 
labor and capital than before, which in turn reduces the ratio of value-added 
exports to gross exports. At the same time, however, Korean manufacturers also 
increased their contribution to foreign GVCs by supplying intermediate goods, 
thereby accounting for more than 50% of the total manufacturing GDP. Another 
result of Korea’s active GVC participation is the reallocation of labor within the 
domestic manufacturing industry toward skilled workers and thereby an increase in 
the wage premium. 
Although the findings above are mainly to inform the reader of the overall trend 
in the international activities of Korean industries, they still have several policy 
implications. The first is related to the need to strengthen the input competitiveness 
of domestic industries. The GVC perspective emphasizes that we should focus 
more on contributing to the product than on the selling price. Thus far, Korea has 
been good at exports, but in many exporting products, the core inputs with high 
value-added tend to be outsourced from foreign countries, particularly Japan. This 
tendency is more evident in major exporting industries and thus reduces the 
contribution of exports to GDP, as shown in Table 2 and Figure 4.14 Therefore, 
domestic industries need to develop the ability to provide highly valued inputs in 
this GVC world. Note also that the need to strengthen the input competitiveness is 
not specifically limited to manufactured goods. Figure 6 shows that significant 
service inputs are embedded in manufactured goods, but the competitiveness of 
Korean services has been weak, as indicated in Figure 5. 
The second policy implication, related to the first, is to provide more incentives 
to firms to locate their production facilities in Korea. In the end, the GDP is created 
only when production activities occur within domestic territories. The high reliance 
on offshoring can seriously hamper domestic economic growth when global 
demand shrinks, as shown in Figure 7. On the other hand, Tables 5 and 6 (as well 
as Figures 9 and 10) indicate that domestic industries create ever-growing amounts 
of value-added and employment by participating foreign GVCs as intermediate 
goods exporters. Hence, it is important to incentivize firms to locate and produce 
within Korea, regardless of whether they are domestic- or foreign-owned. Korea 
has been in fact unattractive to foreign firms, as the ratio of inbound FDI stock to 
GDP was only 13.7% in 2013, the third lowest among all OECD countries.15 
Thirdly, industrial policies should reflect the trend of foreign final demand. As 
shown in Figure 3, close to one-third of Korean GDP was created by foreign final 
 
14Recall that the VAX ratios of three major exporting industries are just about 0.4.  
15The average ratio of inward FDI stock to GDP in all OECD countries is 61.1%, while the ratios of Japan 
and Greece are 3.5% and 11.5%, respectively. 
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demand in 2011, and this reliance on foreign final demand has been much larger 
than in 1995. As Korea has become one of the most globalized countries, its 
economy can easily be affected by foreign economic shocks. Thus, suitably 
managing such foreign shocks should be essential to the economic success of 
Korea. In particular, Table 3 indicates that China is now the largest single consumer 
of Korean value-added, which implies that structural changes in Chinese final 
demand can systematically affect Korea’s production and exports (see Chung 2015 
for more details). 
 
APPENDIX  
 
In this appendix, we derive the equations for GVC income, GVC employment, 
and value-added exports. Suppose there are N  countries and S  sectors in each 
country. Each country produces only one good (or service) within each sector. 
Hence, there are N S  goods in the world that can be used as either an 
intermediate good ( )m  or a final good ( ).f  We denote  ( )iy s  as the output of 
sector s  in country i  for a given year. Let the final demand in country j  for 
good s  produced in country i  be   ,ijf s  and the intermediate demand in 
sector s  in country j  for the good s  in country i  be ( , ).i jm s s   
The market clearing condition for the good s  in country i  is then given by 
 
(A1)                  , , .i ij ij ij ij
j j s j s
y s f s m s s f s m s s
 
             
 
The gross exports in sector ݏ from country i  to country j  is, by definition, 
the sum of its intermediate and final good exports: 
 
(A2)                            , .ij ij ij
s
x s f s m s s

     
 
It is convenient to express above equations in vector and matrix notations. First, 
we define the following notations. 
 
iy : output of country i  1S    
 
y : output of all countries  1SN    
 
ijf : final demand of country j  for all goods from country ݅ (ܵ × 1) 
 
jf : final demand of country j  for all goods from all countries  1SN   
 
j
j
f f : final demand of the world for all goods from all countries  1SN   
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     , , /ij ij ja s s m s s y s   : unit value of good ݏ in country i  to produce one 
unit (value) of good s  in country j , i.e., the input coefficient 
 
A : input coefficient matrix where  ,ija s s  is a typical element  SN SN   
 
   1 ,i j s jir s a s s   : value-added to output ratio in good s  in country i  
 
R : diagonal matrix where   ir s  is a typical element  SN SN  
 
F : diagonalized matrix of f   SN SN  
 
(A1) can then be rewritten in the form of the equation on the left in (A3), which 
can further be solved for ݕ as in the equation on the right-hand side in (A3), 
 
(A3)             1 1   j j j jy Ay f y I A f I A f             
 
where   1I A   is the Leontief inverse. This matrix measures how much each 
sector in each country should produce to satisfy one unit of final demand in the 
world. Therefore, pre-multiplying the Leontief inverse by ܴ gives the value-added 
in each sector created by one unit of world final demand. 
GVC income is obtained when post-multiplying   1R I A   by the actual 
(diagonalized) final demand in the world ( ),F  i.e.,  
 
(A4)                       1 .GVC income R I A F   
 
GVC income can be decomposed further into the incomes by production factors, 
as we know the income share of each production factor. For example, if the labor 
income share of the total value-added in sector ݏ in country ݅ is ݓ௜(ݏ), the GVC 
labor income is obtained as follows, 
 
(A5)                    1  ,GVC labor income WR I A F    
 
where W  is the diagonal matrix with the  iw s  elements.  
GVC employment is obtained when replacing the labor input-to-output ratio, 
  ,il s  with R  in (A4), i.e.,  
 
(A6)                     1 GVC employment L I A F    
 
where ܮ is the diagonal matrix with the ݈௜(ݏ) elements. As in GVC income, GVC 
employment can also be decomposed into the employment by skill level (e.g., low-, 
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medium-, and high-skilled workers) if we know the distribution of employment at 
different skill levels.  
Meanwhile, value-added exports (VAX) of sector ݏ from country ݅ to country 
݆ is calculated as 
 
(A7)                              ,ij i ijVAX s r s y s   
 
where  ijy s  is the output produced in sector s  of country i  due to the final 
demand in country .j  Finally, the VAX ratio of country i  is defined as the ratio 
of its aggregate value-added exports to the aggregate gross exports, i.e.,  
 
(A8)                      
 
   .
j s ij
i
j s ij
VAX s
VAX ratio
x s
 
    
 
WIOT provides all of the necessary information, including industry-level outputs 
(ݕ), final demand (݂), intermediate demand (ܣ), value-added ratio (ܴ), and labor 
input (ܮ). Table A1 and Table A2 show the industry classification and sample 
countries in the WIOT, respectively. 
 
TABLE A1—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION IN THE WIOT AND CORRESPONDING KSIC9 
Industry 
number 
Industry name KSIC9 Three-sector 
classification 
1 Agriculture, Hunting, Forestry and Fishing A Agriculture 
2 Mining and Quarrying B 
3 Food, Beverages and Tobacco 10t12 Manufacturing 
4 Textiles and Textile Products 13t14 
5 Leather, Leather and Footwear 15 
6 Wood and Products of Wood and Cork 16 
7 Pulp, Paper, Printing and Publishing 17t18, 58 
8 Coke, Refined Petroleum and Nuclear Fuel 19 
9 Chemicals and Chemical Products 20t21 
10 Rubber and Plastics 22 
11 Other Non-Metallic Mineral 23 
12 Basic Metals and Fabricated Metal 24t25 
13 Machinery, Nec 285, 29 
14 Electrical and Optical Equipment 26t27, 281t284, 289 
15 Transport Equipment 30t31 
16 Manufacturing, Nec, Recycling 32t33, 37t39 
17 Electricity, Gas and Water Supply D Service 
18 Construction F 
19 Sale, Maintenance and Repair of Motor Vehicles 45, 952 
20 Wholesale Trade and Commission Trade 46 
 
21 Retail Trade; Repair of Household Goods 47, 951, 953 
22 Hotels and Restaurants I 
23 Inland Transport 49 
24 Water Transport 50 
25 Air Transport 51 
26 Other Supporting and Auxiliary Transport Activities 52 
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TABLE A1—INDUSTRY CLASSIFICATION IN THE WIOT AND CORRESPONDING KSIC9 (CONTINUED) 
Industry 
number 
Industry name KSIC9 Three-sector 
classification 
27 Post and Telecommunications 61 Service 
28 Financial Intermediation K 
29 Real Estate Activities 68 
30 Renting of M&Eq and Other Business Activities 62t63, 69t75 
31 Public Admin and Defense; Compulsory Social Security O 
32 Education P 
33 Health and Social Work Q 
34 Other Community, Social and Personal Services 50t60, R, 94, 96 
35 Private Households with Employed Persons T 
 
TABLE A2—SAMPLE COUNTRIES IN THE WIOT 
Country code Country name Country code Country name 
AUS Australia ITA* Italy 
AUT* Austria JPN Japan 
BEL* Belgium KOR Korea 
BGR* Bulgaria LTU* Lithuania 
BRA Brazil LUX* Luxembourg 
CAN Canada LVA* Latvia 
CHN China MEX Mexico 
CYP* Cyprus MLT* Malta 
CZE* Czech Republic NLD* Netherlands 
DEU* Germany POL* Poland 
DNK* Denmark PRT* Portugal 
ESP* Spain ROM* Romania 
EST* Estonia RUS Russia 
FIN* Finland SVK* Slovakia 
FRA* France SVN* Slovenia 
GBR* United Kingdom SWE* Sweden 
GRC* Greece TUR Turkey 
HUN* Hungary TWN Taiwan 
IDN Indonesia USA United States 
IND India ROW Rest of the world 
IRL* Ireland   
Note: * indicates EU27 countries. 
 
TABLE A3—VALUE-ADDED AND LABOR PRODUCTIVITY IN KOREAN SERVICE INDUSTRIES 
Industry 2008 Value-added  
($ hundred million) 
1995 Labor productivity 
($ thousands) 
2008 Labor productivity 
($ thousands) 
Wholesale 32.3 13.3 15.1 
Retail 23.2 13.6 14.7 
Inland Transport 23.7 25.1 27.3 
Finance & Insurance 39.1 41.3 54.0 
Real Estate 15.1 144.4 94.6 
Business Services 68.5 39.3 23.1 
Note: 1995 constant prices. 
Source: World Input-Output Database (WIOD) and the author’s calculations. 
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